Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, why is this taking so long? It was in July 2004 that the Select Committee of this House drew the Government's attention to the fact that the intermittency of wind power makes it subject to the law of diminishing returns: the more wind power you install above a low limit, the less conventional power is displaced and the more unstable the Grid becomes. Given that the problems faced in Denmark and Germany arise from precisely the phenomenon of the law of diminishing returns, is it not time for the Government to give the Select Committee a response to its warning?

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff: My Lords, do the Government recognise that there are already half-a-million patients per annum in this country who would benefit from specialist palliative care skills to maximise their quality of life and allow them to be at home as much as they would wish, but that some PCTs currently seem unable to meet their commitments to hospice providers providing care in the community?

Lord Warner: My Lords, we have been through a process of extensive consultation, which has still not been completed. There are questionnaires on websites; 1,000 people met in Birmingham from all over England 10 days ago, when their views were taken on a wide range of issues, including end-of life issues; and there have been regional consultations. There are many opportunities to find out what we have been doing on the Department of Health website, which the noble Baroness can read if she wishes to do so. Those consultations will lead to a White Paper at the turn of the year, when all will be made clear.

Lord Warner: My Lords, one of the features of this Government—and the reason they have been re-elected three times—is that they listen. I note that the two candidates for the leadership of the noble Lord's party seem to be learning some of those lessons.

Lord Patel: My Lords, will the Minister confirm that the Government and Marie Cure Cancer Care are discussing extending the Delivering Choice Programme to a further 11 sites, to improve end-of-life care for patients, irrespective of their diagnosis? When are the chosen centres likely to be announced?

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, does the Minister agree that the better trained and supervised the prison officers working directly with children in young offender institutions and secure training centres are, the better equipped they are to intervene early and de-escalate situations before they get out of hand and force needs to be used? I welcome the introduction last year of a seven-day training course for prison officers to train other prison offices in the needs of children, but is the Minister aware of the view of the chair of the Youth Justice Board that that is only the most elementary introductory training for prison officers to learn about children's needs? What steps is she taking to improve that training?

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, this speech will be shorter and less rumbustious than the two previous speeches that I have made on this issue. I see the Leader of the Opposition nodding contentedly. I would encourage noble Lords opposite not to spend too much time examining the exact effect of my amendments, because they are probing amendments.
	Noble Lords will recall that the House agreed a number of amendments in Committee on 25 October which fundamentally changed the structure and the content of the Bill, including the introduction of a new freedom of expression exemption. In response to those amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, generously and helpfully said that she would consider the issue further. The purpose of these amendments, therefore, is to find out the current status of the Government's consideration of the Bill.
	First, will the Minister explain to the House at what specific areas of the Bill the Government are looking? Secondly, with whom are the Government discussing these issues? Finally, when does she expect the Government to be able to return to the House with concrete proposals on the way forward? I hope the Minister might feel able to give the House a response to these questions early in the debate. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, with the House's agreement, it may be convenient if at this stage I respond to my noble friend to apprise the House of where we are collectively on these issues. Indeed, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for tabling these amendments.
	The noble Lord has, I know, been a keen supporter of the Government's intentions in introducing the Bill to Parliament. He has spoken eloquently about legislation in this area both at Second Reading and in Committee. Noble Lords will know that there are strong feelings on all sides in relation to how we should move forward. The noble Lord has been kind enough to indicate that these are probing amendments, and they provide me with a valuable opportunity to update your Lordships on the progress we have made so far.
	In Committee strong concern was expressed about freedom of expression. Those concerns led noble Lords to vote substantially in favour of the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Lester, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey, and the noble Lord, Lord Plant. As I indicated then, I wanted to take stock of our position and look for ways in which that deep concern could be addressed without substantially undermining the Government's stated policy aim of legislating to outlaw incitement to religious hatred, which I continue to believe is fundamentally correct.
	We have considered the issues further, and I have had a number of discussions both with those who support the Government's intentions in this area and those who have deep reservations about how the legislation might operate in practice. Those discussions have been ongoing on all sides of the House. I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate that squaring this particular circle is in no way easy. If it were, I am sure that others far wiser than I would have done it a long time ago.
	The time between Committee and today has not been sufficient for the Government to come to a definite resolution of the matters in dispute. There are further discussions to be had, both with the Opposition and with noble Lords on these Benches. Therefore we are unfortunately not in a position to table government amendments for the House to consider on Report. I am, however, continuing to look at how we might make headway and perhaps achieve a level of consensus. I can give your Lordships a personal assurance that we will do all we can to achieve such a consensus, as I am sure your Lordships would wish.
	Four main areas of the Bill have changed as a result of the amendment that was made in Committee. I shall briefly set out our view in relation to each of these. I want to make clear that nothing is set in stone at this stage. In considering how to take the Bill forward, we will look at how our proposals can be adjusted to provide the reassurance that so many of your Lordships have indicated is required. If we are able to achieve that, we will look to table government amendments at a later stage. I hope that that will be at Third Reading.
	The amendment that was made in Committee restructured the Bill so that the religious offence is entirely separate from the racial offence. There are difficulties with providing consistency between that and the existing racial offence, since it suggests—more than we accept—that religion and race are completely separate issues. I accept, however, that the House has clearly signalled its preference for the new framework. We are prepared to consider whether the new structure should remain.
	The amendment also removed the words "abusive" and "insulting" from the offence, leaving only "threatening words or behaviour" capable of prosecution. As I indicated in Committee, we have real difficulties with that change. If we confine the offence relating to religion to cases in which threatening language has been used, we would limit it to a very narrow range of behaviour. In the sort of cases that have been dealt with under the racial offence, it is clear that campaigns used to stir up hatred use a range of words, some of which may be threatening but are not necessarily so. Abusive and insulting words can also be used, and they can have just as devastating an effect on the communities concerned. Therefore, limiting the offence only to threatening words and behaviour would make it far too difficult to get to the sort of material that is used to incite hatred and would severely curtail the ability of the Crown Prosecution Service to bring to justice those responsible. We have to bear in mind that those who seek to take advantage of the provisions will want to craft what they say very keenly to avoid being subject to any restraint provided by us through the law.
	The most important amendment to the Bill is, I respectfully suggest, to the freedom of expression protection included at paragraph 29J to the schedule. My noble friend's amendment would remove that provision and replace it with something far more tightly drawn. That issue is at the heart of concerns raised by most of those who spoke in Committee. The wording currently contained in the Bill would cause us some difficulties in terms of providing a workable offence for prosecutors. However, I believe that it should be possible to include something that goes some way towards that type of wording, which would be sufficiently sound and robust in defending the freedom of speech concerns raised both inside and outside Parliament. That is something that we shall continue to consider and discuss with noble Lords, with a view to coming up with a form of words that I hope will be acceptable to all.
	Lastly, there is the issue of whether intent should be the only threshold for bringing forward prosecution of these offences. Your Lordships will know that that is something that is also being looked at in the context of the Terrorism Bill currently being considered in the other place. While the wording that was used in what is known as the "likely limb" is obviously considered to be too loose by a number of noble Lords in respect of the Bill's offence, we shall want to see whether there is a form of words that will enable prosecutions to be brought without having the unintended consequences feared by many. We understand that that is a difficult road to walk, but we intend to see how best it can be done. If we are successful in doing that, we would hope to be in a position to table amendments at Third Reading, subject to the House's agreement.

Lord Hunt of Wirral: My Lords, I sense that consensus is spreading; it is infectious. I am delighted that the Government have decided to accept the infrastructure which is now the Bill. To have the proposed new religious hatred offences set out clearly in their own schedule to the 1986 Act and not lumped as an add-on to existing racial offences is an important step forward. I welcome the Government's concession on that. We can certainly proceed to deal on that basis.
	The change makes it much easier to understand what is proposed in the Bill. It gives us a great opportunity to get the proposals absolutely right. The change means that we can move on to those other three areas, which I will deal with briefly.
	The first is the "likely" limb, as it is now termed. The Minister should be aware that this is a very important point for a range of my noble friends and other noble Lords. On this side of the House we feel strongly that it is important to have the burden of proof where it is: in the Bill, as amended. We are not dogmatic about that, but we feel the need for reassurance about the likelihood of frivolous or vexatious charges being brought under this legislation, or certainly being investigated under it. We do not believe that the original Bill was watertight. I hope that the burden of proof will be firmly on the prosecution.
	The other main question is the nature of threatening, insulting and—in the middle—abusive behaviour. It is important that we recognise that on this side of the House we are deeply uncomfortable with the notion that causing a sense of insult could, of itself, involve the transmitter in the sort of legal proceedings we are talking about. Insult is in the mind of the insulted person, after all. That is such an important point. If the bar is set so low, the belief rather than the believer is unquestionably being protected. That truly would be a new "right not to be offended". As it stands, "threatening" is much more ad hominem but I look forward to discussing that point with the Minister.
	Finally, on the freedom of expression clause, I detect a willingness on the part of Ministers to accept what is in the Bill. After all, we have merely put into legislation what the Government have always said. Now to see freedom of expression so clearly set out is a huge advance. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, would rip the heart out of the Bill in its amended form. I know that Hearts are very dear to the noble Lord, even in these troubled times, and I hope that he will not force this matter to a vote.
	Everybody will have their own view on what imperfections there may be in the new freedom of expression clause but as I have pointed out, it does no more than embody what Ministers have been saying all along.
	I welcome what the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, has said, although I have a great deal of sympathy with my noble friends who asked for more time. We probably do need more time, whether by means of a recommitment, as my noble friend Lord Skelmersdale suggested, or simply a period of more open discussion. We need to argue our way through this situation rather than take entrenched positions. However, I very much welcome the noble Baroness's expressions of view today.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I hope that I am not out of order in responding to some of the points made. I say to my noble friend Lord Wedderburn that I did not by any means wish to be curt but of others wanted to speak.
	There has been much helpful discussion about where we are now. We very much take into account the comments that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, made about ensuring that we look at the broader framework within which this issue sits. He is right to identify a potential difficulty, and we are bearing that in mind as we go forward. The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right to say that we would hate to see a cloak being given to acts which should properly be dealt with by virtue of an assertion that they were made on some basis of faith. We are very alive to that point.
	We are seeking a level of consensus, and therefore I am concerned in case the noble Lord, Lord Lester, feels that I have in any way trespassed into an area which would make that more difficult. I hope that I have not done so.
	This is not an easy area, as I believe we have all demonstrated in our comments. I very much appreciate the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, who asked whether this is the right time. We are where we are, and certainly the consensus view is that we should try to make progress, if we can, between now and Third Reading in the hope and aspiration that Third Reading can take place at a sensible time when we will have had discussions and will be able to make progress. To do otherwise would defeat the whole purpose of the debate that we are having now.
	I shall deal with the issues in order. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, we are absolutely determined to ensure that frivolous and vexatious cases should not be brought. That is very much part of the thrust of what everyone wishes to see and, as we all know, there is already a sift from the CPS and the Attorney-General. However, I listened carefully to the point made both in Committee and today that it is not just the charges that should be taken into account but also the nature of the bringing of investigations. I very much take that on board.
	I take on board, too, comments made in relation to intent and the "likely to" test. We have had a number of discussions about whether intent simpliciter is enough or whether recklessness or other issues should be considered. I simply reassure the House that those issues are exercising our concerted efforts. I just say to noble Lords that we have to keep the benchmark which will enable proper—I emphasise "proper"—prosecutions still to be possible. I am sure that no one in the House would like us to arrive at a situation where proper prosecution of proper cases in relation to inciting racial and religious hatred were not possible because of any changes that we make. I know that that is not what anyone in this House wishes.
	I hope that I have made it absolutely clear that we understand that freedom of expression is the biggest issue which has caused the most concern. Proper debate, proper discussion and proper criticism of differences in faith and religious belief should not be chilled but should be capable of continuing with an appropriate amount of vigour and vim, as would be consistent with a vibrant democracy. We understand that too. So we will look very carefully to see whether a formula can be brought forward with which all parties can feel more content.
	We are seeking consensus, so it will be incumbent upon us all to move a little. We would like a situation where all would be content, if not totally thrilled. That is an aspiration that we should seek to deliver. I emphasise that many say that the Government's position as presented in Committee was the correct position from which we should not move. We understand that a whole spectrum of views have to be brought together to a position where each can feel comfortable. I know that those sitting on the opposite Benches have similar difficulties going the other way, too.

Lord Avebury: I beg to move the amendment introducing the first new clause. The atmosphere of consensus created by the debate on the previous amendment is very welcome. I particularly appreciated the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, who said that there must be robust exchanges on questions of religion. I hope that that means that the Church is coming round to the view that blasphemy should, at last, be abolished. Although it is impossible to imagine that everyone on the Bishops' Benches would agree with that proposition, if several do so it could be a weighty influence in helping the Government to make up their mind. It is the Government whom we have to convince to take this matter forward after today's debate.
	The last time there was a prosecution for blasphemy in England was the Gay News case of 1976, when the editor of that newspaper was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, subsequently lifted on appeal, for a poem that appeared in the paper. The arguments for abolishing the offence have been dealt with on many occasions in this House since then: in the Blasphemy (Abolition) Bill of 1995; in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill of 2000; the Religious Offences Bill of 2002; in the Select Committee on Religious Offences, which spent a whole year examining the matter in 2003; in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004; and at Second Reading of this Bill only a few weeks ago.
	One of the main reasons for coming back to the proposal now is to make it clear once and for all that this Bill does not, and is not intended to, introduce a new statutory offence of blasphemy by the back door. Subject to this amendment being agreed to, one could say whatever one liked about the sacred entities or beliefs of a faith. There has been no response to the challenge that I issued at Second Reading to draft a form of words "ridiculing holy objects" that would be liable to prosecution under this Bill.
	I mentioned the Ship of Fools website which ran a competition to discover the 10 funniest and 10 most offensive religious jokes. The conclusion was that the Almighty was fair game and that blasphemy was a minority concern. The so-called jokes were indeed grossly offensive and some of them were undoubtedly blasphemous in law as well as according to ordinary English usage, but they would not make any sane person hate Christians. As long as the offence of blasphemy technically exists, however rarely it is used, there is confusion between incitement to hatred of believers and hatred of beliefs themselves. We have seen quite a bit of that already on this Bill. A new argument for getting rid of blasphemy is that it will help to make that distinction absolutely plain.
	There are several other reasons for abolishing this offence and your Lordships have considered them repeatedly. I refer particularly to the report of the Select Committee and, since it covers the arguments in some detail, it is necessary for me to summarise them only briefly. First, nobody can say with any confidence what is blasphemous, because the CPS and the courts may well take a completely different view today from what they did in 1976. When there was a public recitation of the James Kirkup poem, which had led to the Gay News prosecution, on the 25th anniversary of the case, the police took no action and there was no significant demand for them to do so. But the uncertainty of the law may itself lead to self-censorship or even actual censorship as it did in the Wingrove case, which is described in Appendix 3 of the Select Committee's report.
	In that case, the European Court of Human Rights decided in 1996 that the British Board of Film Classification had not violated Article 10 of the convention on the basis that Lord Scarman's speech in the Gay News case had fixed the definition of the offence in common law and that the restriction on freedom of expression was within the limited margin of appreciation accorded to member states in assessing whether the interference was for a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
	That aim was the protection of the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings dealt with by the court in the Otto Preminger case. The Select Committee concluded that the European Court had wrongly assumed that the House of Lords had clearly formulated the law on blasphemy in the Gay News case and it doubted whether the Court would have upheld the BBFC's decision to ban the Wingrove video if the facts had been correctly argued before them. That shows that our blasphemy laws have continued to have reverberations in Strasbourg within the past 10 years and that the uncertainty may well lead to further expensive and divisive litigation in the future.

Lord Wedderburn of Charlton: My Lords, I am happy to accept that further summary of the position from the noble Lord. I was going to say that I had hoped today for a roar of welcome from the Benches of the right reverend Prelates, because they are so near to saying "Yes". The right reverend Prelate indicates that he gave a roar of welcome in principle, for which I am glad, but he too relied on the principle of unripe time to say that we should do it not today but at some future occasion.
	The Church of England should be anxious to get rid of this privileged position. As a secular humanist, I generally support the position of the Church of England. To abolish blasphemy is not to take a step down the road to disestablishment. I would resist disestablishment strongly—I do not say this as a joke; not being an adherent, I may get things wrong, and I apologise if I do—because the Church of England is not a Church that attempts to seize more and more temporal power. There are Churches of that kind, which tend to disapprove and enforce their disapproval of what goes on in the bedroom, tend to tell you that you have got to believe in myths that seem to evolve, decade on decade, with bodily ascensions and all sorts of other stories, and are very fierce with you—at least in theory—if you do not believe in and do not do what they say in the privacy of your life.
	The Church of England has developed, like the rest of law and practice, into a very modern position. It has freed itself from the wish to impose controls of that kind, and it has come very close, even within itself, to accepting the equality of women, which is one of the most important developments of our time. I am very happy that it brings to such problems a broad and liberal mind. It has a bit of a way to go, and I shall judge it as having achieved its final or near-final step on that road when it demands from the BBC that "Thought for the Day" on Radio 4, to which I am sure all your Lordships listen avidly every morning, includes regular contributions from such noted thinkers as Professor Richard Dawkins and Dr Jonathan Miller, whose programme on disbelief I am sure that your Lordships enjoyed last night.
	 The general position of the Church of England is consistent with and promotes a discussion about freedom of expression. It is my hope that your Lordships will express a view—if invited to do so tonight—and that we shall be with the Bishops when they come to vote in the Aye Lobby, as I believe that the vast majority of this House and the other House would, if given the opportunity. Let us give them the opportunity and settle the matter, which we all know should be settled now.

Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, I am very aware of that fact and thank my noble friend for bringing it to my attention.
	There are things that are required by the law of our country, such as Christian teaching and assemblies at schools. Remembrance Day services are an essential part of public life. When national disasters happen, they are always marked by a Church service, as we saw recently. In the United Kingdom, our culture, laws, democratic institutions, architecture, literature, art and science have all been profoundly influenced by Christianity and cannot be understood without reference to it, no more than any of us could understand Chinese art or any of the buildings that you see in Thailand without reference to Buddhism or the Chinese religions. The Christian faith has played a major part in the many great social reforms of our history, such as the creation of schools and hospitals, the abolition of slavery, the improvement of working conditions and the protection of children.
	Along with the coronation oath, the blasphemy laws are an important expression of principle: that the name of Jesus Christ is above any other name. As the Bible records, God exalted him to the highest place and gave him the name that is above every name. Moreover, the blasphemy laws today are essentially a defensive measure. No one will be put in prison for breaking them, unlike the religious hatred offence proposed in the Bill.
	It is the symbolic nature of the blasphemy laws that secularists object to. If that were not so, they would not show such interest in repealing the law on blasphemy, given that it is rarely used in practice. I sometimes fear that the campaign to remove the blasphemy laws is part of a wider agenda to remove all association between the state and Christianity and any reference to the only true God in public life.
	It is sometimes wrongly claimed that a law on blasphemy is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. In fact, several unsuccessful challenges to blasphemy law have come before the European Court of Human Rights in recent years. In the 1996 case of Wingrove v United Kingdom, the court held that this country's blasphemy laws were compatible with Article 10(2) of the Convention. The court stated:
	"The extent of insult to religious feelings must be significant, as is clear from the use by the courts of the adjectives 'contemptuous', 'reviling', 'scurrilous', 'ludicrous' to depict material of a sufficient degree of offensiveness. The high degree of profanation that must be attained constitutes, in itself, a safeguard against arbitrariness".
	We are right to have a blasphemy law. There is good evidence that many ordinary people identify with the Christian faith and many Christian moral values. I have said on several occasions in your Lordships' House that the 2001 census found that 72 per cent of the UK population identified themselves as Christian. Clearly, the state and individuals have embraced secular values and beliefs in many areas, but the UK is not a secular state, and its people are generally theists who believe themselves to be Christians. Even the Guardian newspaper's editorial, following the publication of the census, stated on 28 February 2003:
	"This is a Christian country simply in the unanswerable sense that most of its citizens think of themselves as Christians".
	The truth is that every society that seeks cohesion has laws that enshrine its most fundamental beliefs. Blasphemy law falls into that category and protects our shared values. Any reform or abolition of the blasphemy laws cannot be looked at separately from the constitutional role of Christianity in the state. I oppose the noble Lord's amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, it is extremely rarely that I disagree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, but I shall do so briefly this afternoon. I hope that he will reconsider some of the main strands of his opposition to the amendment so clearly and well moved by my noble friend Lord Avebury.
	The right reverend Prelate said that he did not see a connection between religious hatred and blasphemy and that therefore it was inappropriate to make the amendment to the Bill. There is a connection, in that blaspheming is one way of expressing and fomenting hatred. He also said that this was not the time to introduce this reform into the Bill—the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, spoke about that at some length—but I believe that this is the time.
	The law of blasphemy, as the right reverend Prelate admitted, is more or less a dead letter. It is nearly 30 years since we last had a prosecution, and when we had one it promoted more confusion than light. As a Low Church ecumenical Anglican, I believe that, if anything, the law is now an encumbrance to the Church, and against the spirit of the age, which is one of extreme liberality of view and expression of view. In a strange way it works against the Church, in that it gives some people the notion that it cannot stand on its own feet and fight its own corner as other faiths and organisations have to do. I see no good argument for keeping it in place except the traditional one. I am a traditionalist: a good tradition knows when to steal away.
	For those of us who find the Bill as originally drafted unacceptable in creating an offence of promoting religious hatred, this is a perfect opportunity for the church to sacrifice this legislative bauble to the greater cause; to find a common position with other faiths, particularly Islam at this time; to claim no special protection; to say that we stand with you, the same under law as you are; and to proceed from there. There are public order laws to prevent the worst infractions of order and decency. Such a gesture would resonate throughout the Church community and among the public at large.

Baroness Whitaker: My Lords, may I add one voice to the amendment? I did not add my name to fourth place because I hoped that someone from the Benches not represented by those who tabled the amendment would do so. I believe there is a broad consensus outside the House for change.
	My noble friend Lord Plant gave far more eloquently than I can all the reasons why the amendment ought to be supported. I understand the point made by the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Oxford, on timing. I ask the Minister to tell us what the Government can say in respect of consultation with the bishops and others on the matter?

Lord Hunt of Wirral: My Lords, another advantage of the Bill in its amended form is the ease with which we can discuss an issue as important as blasphemy. We are greatly indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who has long campaigned on this issue, in delivering what I thought was a tour de force, aided and abetted by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, with his tour d'horizon.
	We have had a very balanced debate. Some wise words of caution have been uttered. We have heard a powerful case for arguing that the rather aged law against blasphemy should be reviewed as part of the new settlement in this troubled area of the law. Does the Minister believe that the law of blasphemy can now coexist with the freedom of expression clause in this amended Bill or, indeed, with any slightly improved version of it?
	As noble Lords will know, some saw in the Government's original Bill a vehicle not for abolishing the law of blasphemy but for extending it to religions other than Christianity. I believe that that shadow has now passed, and it is entirely right that we should now consider what settlement is appropriate and sustainable in this area in a highly diverse and liberal society. I am not saying that blasphemy has had its day but, in view of the clear view already expressed in this House on the question of freedom of expression in religious matters, I think that the burden of proof is now with those who wish the blasphemy laws to remain rather than those who would abolish them.
	We have heard some very persuasive speeches on either side of the argument. My noble friend Lord Renton made a very good point about paragraph (c) of the amendment, which concerns,
	"any religious offence of striking a person in a church or churchyard".
	The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford referred to paragraph (b) concerning,
	"any distinct offence of disturbing a religious service or religious devotions".
	I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is right to say that other areas of the law cover that, but I think that the fact that he seeks to abolish not only blasphemy and blasphemous libel but also these other offences justifies my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern in saying ,"Let's tread carefully".
	The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, had a point when he talked about taking time and proceeding with caution in such a traditional area. My noble friend Lord Crickhowell made some very good points to justify pausing for a few moments before proceeding, and the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, also made a number of valid points. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, summarised the position by referring to the doctrine of "unripe time"—a phrase that has been mentioned several times. It is a wonderful, glorious phrase. It is actually a complete paradox or oxymoron because time is never ripe, although many who have expressed views in the past have thought that it is.
	My noble friend Lady O'Cathain made a very well argued speech, pointing up a number of issues that we must consider. Although the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, referred only to paragraph (a) and implicitly conceded that we also have to think carefully about paragraphs (b) and (c), I think that, mainly due to the intervention of the right reverend Prelate, the balance of argument has been on the side of consultation.
	Although my noble friends will be voting in accordance with their conscience on those matters, there is some merit in pausing to consider what, in essence, the right reverend Prelate enunciated—namely, a red signal to this amendment but a green signal to the principle. We have to pause for a moment to try to work out what that means. I suppose it means that we should take a little time carefully to think through what we are doing; or it could mean that the Bishops' Bench want a little time to think through what their advice will be.
	I do not think the argument that this is not the Bill holds up. In its truly amended form, it deals with this issue. Therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has every right to say that this is the moment on which we have to reach a decision. Speaking for myself, however, I find it difficult to vote in favour of the amendment in the face of the red light from the Bishops' Bench and, indeed, some of the good speeches made by my noble and learned friends. On balance, therefore, I would side with caution and consultation, just as we went with caution and consultation about the whole text of the Bill a few moments ago.
	I hope that consultation can be meaningful and speedy. The Government have said that they want their Bill, and that they have instanced the manifesto commitment. Surely, however, particularly in the light of this debate, there is a good argument for saying that we ought now to take the time to get this Bill right before we return it to the other place. I do not see the need of rushing to a date for Third Reading. Rather, as my noble friend Lady Carnegy of Lour said earlier, there is an argument perhaps for having a recommittal of the Bill, to go through it line by line in Committee. Why is there this rush? It is surely much more important that we get this right than we move speedily to get it wrong.
	These issues are so important that I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, having initiated a good debate, will be content to wait for a further period of consultation before moving to a vote. In the mean time, I leave it to my noble and learned friends to exercise whatever decision the House may be asked to take on the grounds of their own conscience.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, at the risk of boring your Lordships, I would like to clear up the question that has been raised by several noble Lords on the offences (b) and (c). The noble Lord, Lord Renton, the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, in an intervention and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in winding up all mentioned these two common law offences which have fallen into disuse for centuries. I referred to the Law Commission's report of 1985 and I remind your Lordships that it refers to statements in Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown to the effect that,
	"'all irreverent behaviour' in churches and churchyards has been regarded as criminal. More specifically there is authority, by no means strong, for the proposition that it is an offence at common law . . . to disturb a priest of the established Church in the performance of divine worship and also, it seems to disturb Methodists and Dissenters when engaged in their 'decent and quiet devotions'".
	The cases referred to are R. v Parry of 1686 and R v Wroughton of 1765.
	The report goes on to mention that it is an offence,
	"to strike any person in a church or churchyard",
	The cases referred to there are Wilson v Greaves of 1757 and Penhallo's case of 1590.
	The offences in (b) and (c) fell into disuse centuries ago and have been replaced in modern times by statutory offences such as common assault, for example, in the case of striking a minister in the churchyard. I hope that that will dispose of the point raised by several of your Lordships. I could also refer to the Select Committee's report, at paragraph 21, but I will not bother to quote that in detail because the point has been sufficiently made. However, your Lordships should allow that it was reasonable to put these other common law offences up for abolition at the same time as blasphemy.
	I am most grateful to all those who have taken part in this debate. It is right for me to observe that only the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, and possibly the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, opposed the proposition that blasphemy should be abolished outright. Every other speaker, including the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, speaking from the Conservative Front Bench, has said that it is ridiculous still to have this offence, but this is not the right place to abolish it.
	The Minister repeated what the Home Secretary has said elsewhere: that he does not want to move to legislate on the matter until there has been proper consultation. I do not know what we were doing for a year in the Select Committee: We took evidence from everyone: the Church of England, the Catholics, the Methodists, the Muslims, the Sikhs, the Hindus—you name it, they all came. We spent a whole year examining just this question. Now the Minister wants us to start on another round of consultation. That is an excuse for procrastination.
	As St Augustine said in The City of God,
	"da mihi castitatem . . . sed nomi modo"—
	"give me chastity, but not yet". The Minister says, "This is a wonderful idea, but we are not going to do it now". She invited me not to test the opinion of the House, but there has been sufficient interest in this debate for me to do so now.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 113; Not-Contents, 153

Lord Avebury: My Lords, perhaps I may be allowed a comment on that vote. I believe that the Minister will agree that it was worth putting the amendment to a Division because it demonstrated a radical change in the opinion in your Lordships' House since we last debated blasphemy. It is moving in the direction that I would like to see—that of total abolition—and we probably would have got there had there been a free vote on the Government's side of the House as there was on this side. I will leave the Minister to reflect on that and on whether it is appropriate to embark on yet another round of consultation to substitute for the work that has already been done at such great length by the Select Committee, as she acknowledges.
	Of all the statutory offences against religion that are left over from the 19th century and examined by the Select Committee on Religious Offences, the only one that has been used in recent years is Section 2 of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act, which forbids,
	"riotous, violent or indecent behaviour in a church or chapel of any denomination, or in any place of worship certified under the Registered Places of Worship Act 1835".
	It is also an offence under this section to,
	"molest, let, disturb, vex, or trouble . . . any preacher duly authorised to preach therein".
	That extends also to ceremonies held in a churchyard or burial ground.
	The question is not whether churches, mosques or gurdwaras need the protection of the law against people who might disrupt their services or other religious activities but whether they should have some additional safeguards which are not available in secular premises, and, if so, whether this elderly statute is the right answer. As far as non-Christian places of worship are concerned, they do not appear to see the ECJA as useful considering that only a very small fraction of them have registered under the 1855 Act. It has never been used, to the best of our knowledge, in relation to any place of worship other than a church of the Established Church. The Select Committee found it extremely difficult to obtain any statistics and the Home Office acknowledged that its figures were unreliable because of errors in the procedure for coding offences in the courts.
	The Home Office was unable to identify any of the cases behind the statistics. Separate inquiries by the Select Committee unearthed details of two convictions which were classified as ECJA but where charges of criminal damage had been preferred at the same time and the courts had ultimately convicted under that heading. The third case where details were available was the very well known one of Mr Peter Tatchell, who was prosecuted in 1998 for causing a disturbance in Canterbury Cathedral, I believe while the Archbishop was preaching. The stipendiary magistrate fined him £18.60, showing neatly what the court thought of the case. But if disturbances were considered serious enough to justify prosecution, they could be dealt with under the Public Order Act and, if the offence was found to be religiously aggravated, the offender would be liable on summary conviction to a sentence not exceeding six months' imprisonment.
	Since the Select Committee's report, the data for 2003 have been published showing that there were three prosecutions and one conviction during the year. Assuming that the initial charge was correctly recorded, the conviction may well have been for some other offence, as with the 2002 cases I have mentioned. We have no means of knowing. The Home Office is obviously not interested or it would have taken steps to collect the information when it was put on notice of the difficulties that were experienced by the Select Committee. The data for 2004 have yet to be published—they are due on 17 November—but the Home Office has kindly allowed me a preview and I can tell your Lordships that so far this year there have been 15 prosecutions, resulting in 10 acquittals, four findings of guilty—in two cases a fine was imposed, in one a community sentence and in one imprisonment—and one under the heading "otherwise dealt with".
	Churchwatch, an organisation that monitors offences of all kinds on church premises, believes that the ECJA is a convenient means of dealing with disrespectful conduct falling short of actual criminality, such as eating or smoking in church, men wearing hats or going bare-chested, or skateboarding in churchyards. Some churches have printed notices with the text of Section 2 and their own explanation of the meaning of the word "indecent", which they give to people engaging in such activities and ask them to leave the premises. They find that often this works. But they also acknowledge that the same result might be achieved by using printed copies of Section 4A of the Public Order Act.
	These minor breaches of good taste and decency have to be seen in the context of a general deterioration in standards of behaviour, including respect for places of worship and ministers of religion, and a steep growth in crimes against persons and property belonging to churches, which, sadly, has led to many being locked except during services. That is not a problem that we can deal with here by legislation, and certainly not by the archaic language of the ECJA, which is unfamiliar territory to most prosecutors and the public.
	The ECJA has been superseded by modern laws on criminal damage and public order. It is hardly ever used, as I have demonstrated, and it is not of sufficient consequence for the Home Office to bother keeping reliable statistics or enabling the cases to which they refer to be retrieved. This is a good opportunity for Parliament to remove a piece of clutter from the statute book. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for raising this issue. As he has identified, Section 2 of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act provides protection from low-level public mischief taking place in churches of the Established Church to other registered places of worship. As a point of information, it is important that we recognise that 1,587 non-Christian places of worship were registered under the Religious Places of Worship Act 1855 at the time of the Select Committee's report. Therefore, they, too, are eligible under the ECJA for protection. Unlike blasphemy and a number of the other offences to which the noble Lord has referred in the past, this provision is used, as is demonstrated by the figures cited by the noble Lord.
	The Select Committee on Religious Offences heard evidence from the Director of Public Prosecutions that it provides a route to prosecution for some forms of undesirable behaviour which would not be covered by other parts of the law. So it is not otiose. Although prosecutions have been few in recent times, the Director of Public Prosecutions told the committee—I am sure the noble Lord will remember this—that it was used sufficiently regularly for it to be considered a useful offence. We are dealing with a single-issue Bill today and, as with blasphemy, we are very keen to have a single message and to convey it with clarity. It is for that reason that we consider it unhelpful to cloud the issue with further matters which may cause unnecessary confusion. It is quite right that these and some of the other issues to which we will turn shortly may well be properly the subject of further discussion, but not in this Bill.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, the Minister is right to cite the DPP's assertion that this offence provided a means of dealing with offences that were not covered by other parts of the criminal law. However, she omitted to add that the DPP, when challenged, also was unable to provide the committee with details of a single case where someone had been prosecuted for the offence. As I have said, when we looked into the matter we found that some of the offences were misclassified because the code number used by the courts began with three digits, which applied to some 50 or 60 other miscellaneous offences, and the clerks entering the details into the computer frequently made mistakes. Also, as I have explained, prosecutions under the ECJA were accompanied by charges brought under some other statute, and the statistics collected by the Home Office do not reveal what the ultimate conviction was for; they reveal only what the charges were. So if a person is charged under two different offences, and the main one happens to be under the ECJA, the figures are not corrected to cover the changes that may have been made during the proceedings.
	I continue to assert that not only is the offence used very rarely but that, where it is used, it could very well be dealt with by some other provision in the criminal law. I can see, however, that I am not going to persuade the Minister of that today. I shall reflect on what she said and I may well come back to the matter at Third Reading. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 3A*:
	Page 3, line 10, at end insert "and shall include the desecration of symbols or sacramental objects that are important to such a group of persons"

Lord Dholakia: The amendment is to the schedule and would extend the meaning of religious hatred. The schedule states that,
	"'religious hatred' means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief".
	My amendment would add the need to take into account the desecration of sacred objects.
	I say at the outset that my amendment does not reflect my party's policy, but I want to explain my concern about recent events that have done serious harm to the religious beliefs of our different faith communities. Two recent events demonstrate how inadequately we deal with hatred of this kind. Last week we learned that more than 40 Muslim graves were desecrated in Birmingham. It is easy to deal with such matters as criminal damage, or to use other legal means, but the underlying hurt does irreparable damage to our faith communities. The shockwaves of what happened in Birmingham were felt across the whole country.
	The second incident was reported in our national newspapers only yesterday. I am aware that the matter is under investigation by the Metropolitan Police, but suffice it to say that an allegation has been made by a Muslim man that a police officer desecrated his Koran by throwing it into a rubbish bin when arresting him. The incident is alleged to have happened last Monday in south London, and the man also alleges that he was assaulted while being detained at his home. Muslims believe that a copy of the Koran is sacred and must be treated with respect. Throwing it in the bin could be viewed as a grave insult amounting to desecration. I shall not go further into that case, but we await the outcome of the investigation undertaken by the Metropolitan Police.
	There are other examples that are hurtful to the community. All of us are aware of the alleged mishandling of the holy Koran where the US military confirm that it had identified five incidents in which the holy book was mishandled by American personnel at the Guantanamo Bay prison camp. The report sparked protests across the Muslim world. In Afghanistan, riots resulted in at least 15 deaths. I do not believe that we shall ever find out whether the holy Koran was flushed down the toilet, but it is not disputed that such incidents create extreme hurt to our Muslim community.
	There are incidents of pig heads being left outside Mosques. It is only recently that prison officers who deal with Muslim inmates have understood how to handle the holy book. It is not uncommon that even the most gentle inmates become violent when their religious beliefs are hurt.
	Another incident relates to some Christian fanatics who vandalised a Hindu temple. Two young white men reportedly intruded into a temple service in Ealing Road, in London. One of the men snatched the microphone and shouted that there was only one God and that the congregation was stupid to worship a stone. They then shook the idol until it was broken. The Hindu community was deeply offended that its sacred images were desecrated by those two persons. Of course we could argue that there are powers to deal with religiously aggravated criminal damage cases. In this case the Hindu community said that it had lost confidence in the ability of the CPS to prosecute in such cases. The community has a list of regular incidents from 1993 in which temples and festivals have been vandalised. Very few of such incidents have resulted in prosecution. Jewish cemeteries are regularly vandalised. Synagogues have been painted with swastikas and headstones covered with anti-Semitic graffiti.
	There are powers to deal with religiously aggravated criminal damage, but they fail to take into account the wider insecurity of communities that feel that their hurt is never clearly understood or dealt with. The Government were keen to tell the Muslim community about the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, and we all know about the letter sent by the Home Secretary to the mosques in this country prior to the election. I very much hope that the Home Secretary will write a further letter to the mosques and temples saying what the Home Office is doing to protect the beliefs of religious minorities in this country. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. If we want the clearest possible evidence of religious hatred, it is the destruction, or desecration, of symbols or sacramental objects. I was party to meetings in Ealing about the experience the noble Lord mentioned. I am very well aware of the very strong sense of hurt that was felt about those actions because of the nature of belief and the nature of the objects which were destroyed and damaged.
	Given the debate in this House and elsewhere about how to define religious hatred, this is the most tangible way in which we can demonstrate that it occurs. For that reason, I hope that my noble friend will in her reply give careful consideration to the arguments. What causes frustration and a feeling that society and the criminal justice system care little about these matters is the fact that the only charges that could be brought under these circumstances are fairly minor ones in terms of criminal damage, with no indication of the severity of the hurt that has been caused and no understanding of the feelings of the communities concerned about the hatred that is being expressed towards them and their beliefs.
	I have respect always for my noble friend Lord Desai. The Bill is designed to protect individuals rather than their beliefs. However, the amendment is not about beliefs but about the impact that those acts of desecration have on a large number of individuals. Having heard the very strong views expressed by several hundred people at the meeting I attended, I think that the Government need to look at this very carefully.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, the Home Office collects figures of offences that are racially or religiously aggravated and publishes them from time to time, but they are very difficult to get at. I have spent many a weary hour looking for them on the Home Office website. Can the Minister find some way of giving the statistics greater prominence so that the communities which are affected, as my noble friend described, have regular bulletins of information showing how many offences of this kind have been reported to the police, what happened to them and what sentences were passed?
	We know from the figures that I have already given your Lordships on the Ecclesiastic Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 that the Home Office collects these figures. It can say how many cases were prosecuted and what penalties were imposed but it cannot describe the individual ingredients of particular offences. I urge the Minister to see whether something cannot be done to collect that information and make it more widely available so that at least some reassurance can be given to the communities which are affected that proper efforts are being made by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to bring the culprits who do these horrible things to justice.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Peyton of Yeovil, but I am going to be very careful in what I say for this simple reason: I do not want to say anything which is likely to make it more difficult to reach an agreement with the Government along the lines that were suggested earlier today. Therefore I will make only a couple of points. Firstly, one should not seek to define religion by Act of Parliament. The Human Rights Act 1998 did not do so; neither does the European Convention on Human Rights. If this definition were to be regarded as appropriate to theistic religions, it would not be regarded as appropriate to, for example, Buddhism. As I understand it, that is not a theistic religion. That may be a boring and technical reason, perhaps an important one, but it is one which anyone who has followed the Charities Bill will understand. The Government eventually changed the whole approach on the meaning of religion in the Charities Bill to make clear that it included non-theistic religions, especially Buddhism.
	That is beside the point, because the main point which the noble Lord makes is that one should only criminalise freedom of expression where, in his words, there is,
	"justifiable and immediate fear of violence."
	That was the approach of Oliver Wendell Holmes, of Justice Brandeis and of Justice Cardozo in all the great American free speech cases. On one reading, it is also the approach under the European Convention on Human Rights. I have great sympathy for that point, and for limiting the scope of what we have to a justifiable and immediate fear of violence, or something resembling it. However, I believe that the amendments passed by your Lordships' House in Committee strike a fair balance between freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to equal treatment without discrimination, a fair criminal process and the principle of legal certainty and proportionality, and so on.
	I hope that the Minister will respond fully to the important speech made this evening by the noble Lord, Lord Peyton. However, speaking for myself, were the House to divide and accept the amendment, it would make it that much more difficult to secure overall agreement within the principles—and the three essential safeguards—that your Lordships' House has already approved.

Lord Desai: My Lords, I am reminded of the remark recently made by Madonna; that Tom Cruise could do what he liked, even if he wants to worship a turtle. It does not bother her if some people worship turtles as superior beings. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, anticipated something that I wanted to say. This definition of religion certainly does not cover Buddhism, Sikhism or Jainism. None of those three belief systems would be covered by a belief either in God or in a supreme being. In the case of Sikhs, they might actually worship a book—the Guru Granth Sahib—or, in the Jain case, a number of gurus. If we are to have a definition of religion, and whether we do is a matter for the Government to choose, I would wish for the definition to be cast much wider than it currently is. Certainly, it should cover all religions.
	I was once asked by someone, in an application for the Charities Commission, whether I supported Scientology being a religion. Since I believe anything can be a religion, I said "Yes". Therefore I wrote a definition that a religion was, more or less, a coherent set of inconsistent, irrational beliefs about the nature of the universe. The Scientologists objected to my definition and asked me to withdraw the letter in their support. But there is, possibly, some point in defining religion, provided we can do it broadly enough so that all religions can be covered by it.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, has set me a difficult challenge. I am to avoid piety and agreement in an egregious manner with members on the opposite Bench and still answer his questions. I hope to be able to do that in a way which satisfies him. The Deputy Chief Whip tells me that it would be almost a physical impossibility for a Home Office Minister, of whatever complexion, not to hanker after the old Bill. But I can tell your Lordships that it is a temptation which I find very easy to resist, because I am a total realist and pragmatist about where we now find ourselves.
	The most important thing now is to try to chart a way through this issue and bring consensus. I hope that I outlined clearly in my comments earlier today that we have accepted the construct and framework set out by the view expressed by the Committee when we dealt comprehensively with those matters. We are looking with a great deal of purposeful energy at how we can express better the freedom of expression criterion so that it does not do violence to our ability to prosecute these offences. It should honour the real concern which was expressed all around the House—just as volubly, indeed, from our own Benches—that freedom of expression has to be preserved and promoted in a way with which others will feel content. There are more difficulties, and I have set out what they are. My hope and aspiration is that we will be able to mediate a way through them to arrive at consensus. That is certainly what we—each of us, as I understood it—have set our minds to achieving. So I hope that in that sense we shall be able to satisfy noble Lords.
	The noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Hunt, have already referred to the reasons why we believe that a definition would be unhelpful in this regard, and unnecessary. I am sure, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made clear, that the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, accepts that his definition does not cover all the religions that are recognised as the major religions—and Buddhism has been mentioned among others.
	I agree with what was said about the European Convention on Human Rights. The definition advocated in this amendment is not as comprehensive or rigorous as the approach to the meaning of religion adopted by the courts in relation to the convention. That approach requires a religion that contains a coherent set of beliefs. All those are things with which I believe that we probably agree—and I know that the noble Lord's amendment is a very piercing probing amendment to ensure that I do not slip off the straight and narrow. I assure him that I know the direction of travel in which we shall have to go to settle this matter—if it can be settled—in a way that is honourable, fair and delivers what we would all wish to see.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to acquaint the House that they, having been informed of the purport of the Charities Bill, have consented to place their Prerogative and Interest, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
	I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
	Moved, That the Bill be now read a third time. (Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, it might be helpful before we get into the detailed consideration of the Bill to make a short statement on the vote that was held on 12 October on Report. Your Lordships will recall that the House voted into the Bill an amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, which removed the control of the Minister for the Civil Service over the terms and conditions of the staff of the new Charity Commission, substituting a provision that would allow the commission to determine the remuneration of its staff subject to an overall remuneration budget agreed with the Treasury. The amended provision is now paragraph 5(3) to a new Schedule 1A to the Charities Act 1993, which appears at line 41 on page 80 of the Bill.
	The Government have since had time to reflect and explore the effects and implications of that amendment. My understanding is that a significant effect of it may well be to remove from the Home Civil Service the staff of the new commission, with the exception of the chief executive, over whose terms and conditions ministerial control survives. That must in turn call into question the status of the commission under the amended Bill as a non-ministerial department. It was and remains the Government's intention that the staff of the new commission should be in the Home Civil Service, as the staff of the present charity commissioners are. I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, intended by his amendment to remove the staff of the new Charity Commission from the Home Civil Service. Accordingly, the Government will consider what steps they can take in another place to ensure that the commission staff will continue to be in the Home Civil Service from the moment when the provisions converting the existing commissioners to the new commission take effect.
	I thank the House for bearing with me while I made that statement, but I thought it only right and proper, given that it was an amendment from your Lordships' House, that I explained the situation and some of the difficulties that it has created. I am prepared simply to say that those noble Lords who are involved in the debate are welcome to join, perhaps with myself or the Bill's Minister and officials, to discuss and reach a deeper understanding of the implications of the amendment. It is probably best left at that.

Lord Campbell-Savours: In moving Amendment No. 1, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 6, which stands in my name.
	The amendments cover what in my view is the most controversial part of the Bill—that is to say, the charitable status of fee-paying schools.

Lord Campbell-Savours: My Lords, I apologise, I did mean Amendment No. 5.
	I apologise for returning to this issue on Third Reading, but since we last considered these matters the Government have produced their education White Paper, which in my view has changed the climate in which this debate takes place.
	The problem at heart is that the Government believe that the public schools—including, for example, Eton and Harrow—are charities. I ask myself, "Who in the Government believes this nonsense?". In my 40 years' membership of the Labour Party, I have never heard it argued that Eton is a charity. The public do not believe it, and neither do Labour MPs, as they will inevitably express in a few weeks when the Bill hits the House of Commons.
	The charitable status of public schools brings charity law into disrepute. The fee-paying schools desperately cling on to that status for the tax benefits. It is perfectly reasonable for public schools to have tax benefits because they reduce the pressure on public expenditure, but charity status is the wrong vehicle to use to provide those benefits. If the fee-paying schools want tax benefits, they should come under separate provisions in the Finance Act in return for providing public benefit. We should just take them out of the area of charity law. The Bill does not do that, though; it leaves it to the Charity Commission to decide their public benefit contribution.
	A Charity Commission that has left Eton, Harrow and other public schools as charities over the years has a question mark hanging over it. Indeed, during consideration in the Joint Committee, I asked around in the charitable sector why it was that the commission, in the view of some, was so timid. I did not like the reply, but I will put it to the House. I was told that it was because the commission's management was riddled with people who have interests in private education for their own children, and they do not want to rock the boat.
	The truth is that I do not trust the judgment of the Charity Commission. They will duck the hard decisions on private education that are required, which brings me to my amendments. They are both about the need for political, parliamentary influence to be exerted on commission decisions in relation to fee-paying schools. Amendment No. 5 draws on the work of the Nathan committee, which made recommendations in 1950 about the future of charities. It recommended that the Charity Commission and the education Minister share responsibility for the charitable status of fee-paying schools, the reason being that the charitable, voluntary and endowed schools and the technically non-charitable LEA-maintained schools were part of the same national system. That position was written into the Charities Act 1960. As a result, until 1973, the Secretary of State for Education was charity commissioner for educational charities, and shared responsibility for those schools with the Charity Commission.
	In 1973, the government changed the law and removed that provision—primarily, many believe, in order to emphasise that there should be two separate school systems: one of fee-paying education out of the reach government for some, and a free education under government supervision for the others. In retrospect, that was a significantly deliberate political Act of Parliament. In 1974, a change of government took place, and a Select Committee of the Commons unanimously recommended that fee-paying schools should retain their charitable status only if they could prove public benefit. That then became my party's policy.
	Today the Nathan principle is as compelling as it was in 1950 and 1960, and it is against that background that the Government, like their 19th-century predecessors, are seeking to create in their White Paper the concept of a national system of education that is more intact. I remind the House that, during the 19th century, governments of both parties assumed that fee-paying schools were part of the state system, and many committees and commissions were set up to keep a state system for education intact.
	Only yesterday the Times reported that a fee-paying charitable school in Liverpool was to become a maintained non-fee-paying school—a healthy development. That school has decided to become part of the non-fee-paying state system. In the circumstances of the new policy, it is absurd that the Charity Commission, which has little educational expertise, should, with the courts as a longstop, be effectively the only arbiter of the place of new maintained schools in the state system.
	Nathan was absolutely right: whatever the status of schools, the Secretary of State responsible for the national system of education should be given reasonable purchase on the shape, framework and operation of a new developing state system. My amendment would restore the shared responsibility between government and the Charity Commission that existed before 1973. I believe that my argument in this regard is compelling, and if your Lordships do not recognise that, I hope that the Commons does when it comes to consider these matters.
	Amendment No. 1 concerns the height of the public benefit hurdle that fee-paying schools will be compelled to surmount if they wish to maintain their charitable status. The issue has been well rehearsed in previous stages, and I do not want to go down that route. The Government's brief, for which my noble friend is required to argue, has been unconvincing. It is an immensely political issue, and one that dominates debates on education in our party. Many obvious and genuine charities resent their charitable status being entangled by the Government with that of Eton, Harrow and the other fee-paying schools.
	The proposition that this criterion should simply be left to a quango—the Charity Commission—and the courts, bodies whose individual members cannot be considered disinterested parties in the light of their personal commitment to private education, is offensive. Decisions about the nature of public benefit should be enshrined in statute by Parliament, particularly by the elected House of Commons. If the latter amendment does not appeal to your Lordships, I hope that the Commons will see the sense of it. I beg to move.

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: My Lords, before I contribute I declare an interest, as this debate concerns independent schools. I have previously declared my interest as a governor of Shrewsbury School, one of the great public schools of the Public Schools Act 1868.
	The general issue has been discussed many times, most notably at our last meeting on a slightly broader amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, which was tested in the House and was not successful. I continue to support the Government. They have reached a delicate balance—not a fudge—on the issue. It stands on three pillars. First, we are all agreed on the need for an independent Charity Commission. The Government have done much to buttress that independence particularly with new sub-section (4) in Clause 6. We made a further buttressing change—I know that the Minister did not like it—on the last occasion to paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 1. We have made the Charity Commission as independent as we can. That is the first leg.
	The second leg is that this independent body has responsibility for establishing and enforcing the public benefit, and there is the requirement that there is proper consultation in Clause 4(4). It has a playing field to work on—and a level playing field at that. It is unfair of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, to say that commission members will duck hard decisions before they have even set out down the road. He says they have little educational experience. We are talking about a range of charities here. He is over-harsh.
	The third leg is that we require the public benefit test to be complied with continuously and not just at the commencement of a charity's life. A level playing field has been established. In his first amendment, the noble Lord wants to reach down and tilt that playing field in respect of one narrow subsection that has caught his eye—or should I say "his ire"?
	The second amendment shows precisely why, we believe, the Charity Commission should be completely independent and free from political interference of whatever kind. I accept that the noble Lord's remarks would fit into a debate on education policy rather than a debate on charities. They do not belong to the issues that we are discussing tonight. With the help of the Government and with amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and from us we have got the Charity Commission in an independent and strong position. I hope that the Government will stand firm and reject the amendment.

Lord Swinfen: My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister and the chairman of the Charity Commission for their letters, which have been most helpful. The purpose of the amendment is to require on the face of the Bill that the Charity Commission must act at all times, when regulating charities, in a manner which is fair and reasonable and to require the commission to have regard to the interests of the people involved in charities, with particular emphasis on the beneficiaries, as well as a charity's material assets, which, as far as I can see, is all that is covered under the 1993 Act.
	The requirement for fair and reasonable behaviour by the commission has had much support within the House, and many of your Lordships have said that they want these words in the Bill. The reasons given so far by the Government for not accepting the amendment, or a similar one, appear both surprising and difficult to understand. The issue identified by the Minister on 12 October—that is, that the commission,
	"would not change its behaviour as a result of the addition of these words, and so the amendment would have no practical effect"—[Official Report, 12/10/05; col. 335.]
	is not one that the amendment seeks to address. There are two issues of importance which it does seek to address. The first, critically, as the noble Lords, Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Dahrendorf, and others have argued, is that it is the perceptions and concerns of charities—especially the smaller ones, whose activities have been seriously adversely affected by commission regulatory conduct in the past—that need to be addressed.
	The second issue relates to the High Court judge's ruling in the Little Gidding Trust case, where the judge, on grounds of shortening the hearing, ruled that he would not take into account whether the commissioners had acted fairly and reasonably in the making of the orders which were the subject of trustee appeal on grounds that the commission had acted with bias, unfairness and unreasonableness in the making of them.
	It is not sufficient for the Minister to attempt to deal with this case law precedent by saying that he understands that the judge so ruled in order to shorten the hearing. Had the Charities Act 1993 placed upon the commission a specific duty to act fairly and reasonably, the judge would have been obliged to take into account the grounds of the appeal and how the commission had acted. I took part in debates on the Bill that produced that Act. Such a measure was not considered necessary at that time but, in my view, it is obviously necessary now when taking into account the Charity Commission's behaviour, as I have described to your Lordships.
	When, on 12 October, we last debated the issue of the commission's duty towards a charity's people, the Minister said several things—at col. 342 of the Official Report. He said that this amendment was unnecessary because it was not possible for the commission to comply with the new objective, which requires the commission to promote the effective use of charitable resources without taking into account the needs of beneficiaries. He suggested that the commission's new duty to increase public trust and confidence in charities would require it to take account of a charity's stakeholders. Such conclusions seem to me to be extremely tenuous and difficult to support from the wording on the Bill.
	The Minister further suggested that the commission's new customer network consultative group will influence the commission to take account of charity people. The requirement on the commission to be accountable and transparent, even if it takes customer service seriously with its new feedback group, has nothing to do with the need to stop the commission occasionally acting in a cavalier and damaging way towards a charity's people. A hand-picked feedback group addressing a commission agenda can, and will, be ignored.
	Finally, the Minister referred to the commission's duty to be accountable. A government agency may be transparent and accountable in a general way to a Minister or Parliament but still sometimes do outrageous things in individual cases to the organisations and people that it regulates without being accountable to them for its actions.
	The Minister's claims are too general. He refers to the general behaviour of the commission in its broad role. Some of the commission's past behaviour can give no confidence that that is sufficient. There is a real need to focus the minds of the commission's staff on an unequivocal statement that they are required to take account of the people and be fair and reasonable when they are pulling a charity apart.
	Is the Minister perhaps afraid that some downtrodden trustee or beneficiary might successfully sue the commission? Offering the ethereal accountability of the commission to the state is totally inadequate. What is needed is accountability to the individual through the courts, and this amendment will help to provide it.
	The charity sector remains founded on morality, and charities expect standards of regulation likewise founded on a moral bedrock of decency. The commission's behaviour has not always met this high standard, and it is necessary that it should meet it and be seen to meet it. I beg to move.

Lord Swinfen: moved Amendment No. 6:
	After Clause 8, insert the following new clause—
	"CHAPTER 2A THE CHARITY INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS REVIEWER
	:TITLE3:The Charity Independent Complaints Reviewer
	After section 2 of the 1993 Act insert—
	:TITLE3:"THE CHARITY INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS REVIEWER
	2A THE CHARITY INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS REVIEWER
	(1) There shall be a complaints reviewer to be known as the Charity Independent Complaints Reviewer (in this Act referred to as "the Reviewer").
	(2) The function of the Reviewer will be to investigate complaints against the Charity Commission's performance of its regulatory role and where appropriate make financial awards of compensation against the Charity Commisison, whether limited consolatory payments or unlimited payments for financial loss, and make recommendations.
	(3) Except where the Reviewer finds the complainant has acted frivolously, vexatiously or unreasonably, the complainant shall not be required to pay any part of the costs of the investigation.
	(4) No complainant shall be required to use an internal complaints procedure of the Charity Commission, the Ombudsman or the courts before the Reviewer will consider the case and any consideration by the Reviewer will not prevent the case subsequently being considered by the Ombudsman or the courts.
	(5) The Reviewer shall be appointed by the Lord Chancellor on such other terms as he, after consultation, shall think fit.""

Lord Swinfen: My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to set the existing Independent Complaints Reviewer on a statutory footing, who is at present appointed by the Charity Commission to look at complaints against itself, with the following significant alterations to the current arrangements: first, to allow the reviewer the power to award financial compensation, instead of merely being able to recommend it; secondly, to allow the reviewer to award compensation to a complainant for financial loss arising from a failure by the Charity Commission, as well as the existing consolatory payments for maladministration; thirdly, to minimise delay in assessing the reviewer by not requiring that the complainant use the Charity Commission's internal complaints procedure first. Together, these changes will bring about a genuinely independent statutory alternative dispute resolution procedure, which will provide an alternative to the High Court as a route to access justice by charities, trustees and others.
	The reason for this amendment is to create a truly independent mechanism for charities, trustees and others to be able to challenge the Charity Commission when they think it is guilty of maladministration or acting unfairly, unreasonably or disproportionately, and to obtain financial compensation for maladministration and financial loss. At present, the Independent Complaints Reviewer is a creature of the commission, which may be ignored if the commission so chooses. By requiring the ICR not to take cases until they have been through the commission's own complaints procedure, the commission has been able to use the complaints and the ICR process as a mechanism of delay—in one case, I am told, in excess of five years.
	The ICR is forbidden to even recommend to the commission the payment of compensation where a charity has suffered real loss as a result of the commission's unfair, unreasonable or disproportionate behaviour. The ombudsman routinely refuses to take up cases where there is still the legal possibility of pursuing the commission through the courts. As we all know, this is a ruinously expensive process for charities and trustees, who have no recourse to legal aid.
	I understand from a letter that the Charity Commission sent to me when I asked how often it had paid compensation that, once, the expenses of Lincoln County Council for Voluntary Services—about £3,500 plus VAT—were paid by the Charity Commission. Another case was pointed out to me where a receiver and manager was appointed on a contingency basis. As the charity had no cash assets at the time, an indemnity was offered. The costs, however, were eventually met by the charity. So, in fact, there is only one occasion when the Charity Commission has paid out of its own pockets.
	In answering this proposal, the Minister drew comparisons between the advantages of the ombudsman and the proposed ICR, concluding that, on the whole, the ombudsman route is advantageous. I do not doubt that it is, but it is rarely available to charities in practice. In replying to the amendment on 12 October, as reported at col. 382 of Hansard, the Minister drew attention to the fact that the Parliamentary Ombudsman can deal with commission maladministration and can recommend financial compensation for real losses. Since the introduction of the Charities Act 1993, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has investigated only eight complaints about the commission's conduct, upholding three of them and recommending financial compensation in two cases. For most complainants, his door has been firmly closed.
	The Minister may be right when he suggests, at col. 381, that the Parliamentary Ombudsman could do financially better for a charity or trustee than a statutory ICR. There are other reasons, however, for having a statutory ICR beyond financial compensation. It would have, and be seen to have, independence from the commission, would be likely to provide a quicker turnaround of complainants and would have greater experience of charities and the commission. At the moment, it looks to me as though we have a prosecutor, jury and judge all rolled into one. I beg to move.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, deserves considerable praise for his tenacity over his attempts to get a more practical and effectual remedy for those who feel hard done by by the Charity Commission. In the course of the debates, we have talked at length about the different layers of remedy and the fact that the Parliamentary ombudsman is a more available source of recompense and assistance than perhaps had been thought. Although this House has done well on many aspects of the Bill, this one has not received the focus that it deserves. In responding, will the Minister assure the House that the Charity commission will at least put out a new, simple, revised leaflet for those who want to make complaints, which tells them exactly where they may go and what they may do? That would help, because there is plainly a lot of misunderstanding about the extent and availability of the existing remedies.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I have listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, in the many debates on this matter and read again the debate on Report. I appreciate not only his tenacity but that the noble Lord feels very strongly about this matter. We do not want to deny people a way of challenging the commission when they feel that it has not acted properly, misled them, or given them advice that led them to make decisions that they would not otherwise have made. There must always be a proper way of challenging the commission. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has been one of the drivers behind the creation of a tribunal to ensure that there is a more accessible form of redress. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, about the need to ensure that there is proper and adequate information about the means of redress. I shall certainly speak again with the commission officials to that point because the information needs to be not only in leaflet form, but on the website and the various other means in which it can be communicated.
	The noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, was concerned about three main issues regarding the existing arrangements. The first was the delay in accessing the ICR or the ombudsman because of, in the case of the ICR, the need to go through the commission's internal complaints procedure, and in the case of the ombudsman, the need to go through an MP. In relation to that, he also said that the ombudsman routinely refuses to investigate cases where there is the possibility of High Court redress—a point that he repeated in his latest remarks.
	The second main issue that the noble Lord raised was the need for a power to award compensation as well as consolatory payments, and the third issue was the independence of the reviewer from the Charity Commission. We do not accept that the current system involves an unacceptable delay to complainants. Under the current arrangements, complainants are asked to raise their complaint with the commission in the first instance before taking their complaint to the existing ICR if still dissatisfied. It is good practice that departments have the chance to respond to complainants themselves in the first instance. The Charity Commission's customer service team dealt with 103 complaints in the year 2004–05. In the same period, the ICR received 32 complaints. Clearly, many of those who were dissatisfied with the commission's standards of service were satisfied by the commission's response to their complaint when they first raised their complaint with the commission. It is right that the ICR is there for those complainants who are not satisfied with the initial response from the commission. We are not aware of any evidence that this system is unacceptable to complainants or that there is real feeling that the commission's internal complaints procedure is a barrier to access to the ICR.
	At Report stage on 12 October the noble Lord also expressed concern that in order to access the ombudsman a complainant has to go through his or her Member of Parliament. Again, we are not aware of any evidence that this is a problem in practice, as confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, during our Report stage debate. While it is absolutely fair that those with a real cause for concern have easy access to the ombudsman, it is important that only genuine cases reach the ombudsman. The noble Lord also mentioned the need in some circumstances for charities to obtain a certificate from the commission before going to court, the cost to charities of going to court and the difficulties charities have of representing themselves against the Attorney-General. He doubted that such arrangements make for easy access to justice.
	We must distinguish between the differing roles and remit of the court and of the ombudsman. The court looks at legal decisions of the commission. We have some sympathy with the concerns of the noble Lord about the difficulties of challenging the commission in the High Court. That is why we are setting up the Charity Appeal Tribunal, in order to make challenging the commission's legal decisions easier. However, this is a separate issue from complaints about the commission on the grounds of poor service or maladministration. The ombudsman looks at maladministration, not legal decisions. The ombudsman would be able to look at any maladministration of the commission even in a case which had been decided by a court or a tribunal on a point of law. As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said last time, there is no need for High Court remedies to have been exhausted in order for the ombudsman to get involved. However, if legal action had been commenced, the ombudsman would not intervene while it was in train.
	The second issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, when moving his amendment on Report was the need for a power to award compensation as well as consolatory payments. I said in our debate on that occasion that the ombudsman can recommend any level of redress if the complainant has evidence to show that he or she has experienced quantifiable financial loss directly as a result of the commission's maladministration and I gave an example to demonstrate that this does happen in practice. As it turned out, on the day of our debate, the ombudsman recommended financial redress of £100,000 in a particular case.
	We do not see any need to duplicate this existing power by setting up a second body for that purpose and I note that the proposed statutory ICR in this amendment would have the power actually to make financial awards. I am not sure how that would work unless the ICR had a budget comprised of public funds. We think that the current arrangements—whereby the ombudsman recommends payments and the departments pay out of their own funds—works and does not need change. If the commission chose to ignore a recommendation of the ombudsman to provide compensation, the ombudsman would refer the commission to the Select Committee on Public Administration, so there is a strong incentive for departments to make the payments recommended by the ombudsman.
	The final point which concerned the noble Lord was the need for a reviewer who is independent of the commission. The ICR is indeed appointed by the commission. However, in common with other similar offices, her terms of reference underline her independence and authority. In addition, there is no evidence that in practice the ICR can be shown to act in a way which is not independent, for example, by showing bias to the commission or by toning down recommendations. In the year 2004–05, the ICR received only one complaint about her service from a Charity Commission complainant. That complaint was related to dissatisfaction with the review findings, rather than the way in which she had dealt with the matter. The ombudsman is appointed by the Queen and reports directly to Parliament and provides an independent final recourse for complainants who have not been satisfied by the investigations of the commission or the ICR into their complaints.
	I also mentioned last time that in the recent annual report the ICR herself doubts whether a "potentially overlapping" office as proposed in the amendment would add anything for the citizen "other than confusion". I do not believe that there are the gaps in the present arrangements as the noble Lord has suggested in his amendment. The current ICR provides a different but valuable and valued addition to the ombudsman service.
	I am sorry that I was not able to convince the noble Lord last time that the current arrangements are satisfactory. I apologise to the House for going over at length why we feel that the situation is best served by the current arrangement. I hope that my explanation this time, although perhaps not to the noble Lord's liking, has helped hin through some of the arguments that we see as obstacles to choosing the course recommended to us by the noble Lord.
	I accept that the amendment is moved in good spirit and is well-intentioned, but it would add confusion and would not provide much, if any, benefit to potential complainants.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, in moving Amendment No 16 I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 24 to 32, which are grouped with it. These amendments fulfil the undertaking I think I gave the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, on Report on 18 October, to consider in consultation with him a number of concerns he had about the operation of the merger provisions in Clause 44. The noble Lord pointed out that the Bill, as drafted, contained measures that meant a merger in which a vesting declaration is used does not need to be notified to the commission. He argued that the vesting declaration was a novel and powerful piece of legal machinery, the use of which ought to be notified so that it would be registered by the commission.
	We accept the argument, so one effect of these amendments, in particular Amendment No. 24, is to require notification to the commission of any merger in which a vesting declaration is used. That notification will then trigger registration of the merger by the commission.
	I could go into more detail related to the amendments, but I am not sure it is entirely necessary. I am sure both noble Lords will understand where we are trying to go with this. It reflects our earlier discussions and debates. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 17 I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 18 to 23, which are grouped with it. Clause 44 is designed to make certain types of merger between charities easier. It does so with two legal devices: one is the vesting declaration, to make the transfer of property from a transferor charity to a transferee charity easier, and the other is a device to ensure that gifts to a transferor charity that take effect on or after the date of registration of the merger belong automatically to the transferee charity, unless they are excluded gifts.
	The Bill provides for the Charity Commission to keep a register of mergers. It allows for any relevant charity mergers to be notified to the commission and requires the commission to enter in the register every relevant charity merger that is notified to it. A relevant charity is defined in subsection (4) of the new Section 75C which is inserted through Clause 44 of the Bill.
	The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, identified at an earlier stage what he considered to be shortcomings in the relevant charity merger definition. It is these shortcomings that this group of amendments seek to address. The effect of the amendments is to make it clearer than the existing words do that a relevant charity merger includes a merger in which the transferring charities have already gone out of existence on the transfer of their property to the merged charity and the merger in which the transferring charities are in future to go out of existence. In other words it clarifies that a merger in which a transferring charity or charities have transferred all their property and are intending to go out of existence but have not yet done so counts as a relevant charity merger and thus can be notified to and registered by the commission. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, Schedule 9 sets out some repeals and revocations that we are making. One repeals an Act but revokes secondary legislation. Amendment No. 35 is a minor drafting amendment to Clause 78 suggested by parliamentary counsel. Clause 78 currently states that,
	"Any amendment or repeal made by this Act has the same extent as the enactment to which it relates."
	Since Schedule 9 includes both repeals and revocations, not just repeals, we need to amend Clause 78 to refer to both repeals and revocations.
	Amendment No. 59 has also been suggested by counsel. Counsel has identified the need to amend the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (Abolition) Regulations 2001 as a consequential amendment to our earlier Amendment No. 107 to the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, which we debated on Report. That amendment was to enable certain functions of the Charity Commission to be contracted out where a Minister makes an order so providing. I beg to move this minor amendments.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, this amendment is about the new schedule to the Bill—Schedule 1D. It allows the Charity Commission to refer matters to the Charity Tribunal which have arisen in connection with the exercise by the commission of any of its functions and involve the operation of charity law or the application of charity law to a particular state of affairs. The Attorney-General may refer to the tribunal matters which involve the operation of charity law or the application of charity law to a particular state of affairs.
	There is a definition in the Bill of what "charity law" means in this context. It is any enactment contained in or made under the Act which this Bill will become, the Charities Act 1993 or any rule of law which relates to charities. The amendment allows the Secretary of State to specify additional enactments which come within the meaning of "charity law" for the purposes of references to the tribunal. We think that it is possible that it might become desirable for the tribunal to consider matters of charity law contained in enactments other than those contained in or made under the Act that this Bill will become and the 1993 Act. This power gives sufficient flexibility to enable the tribunal to grow and develop according to need and avoids the necessity of having a comprehensive list of enactments set out in the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, A community interest company, or CIC, is the new type of company introduced by statute in 2004. A CIC cannot, as we have discussed before, have charitable status, but it must carry on its activities for the benefit of the community.
	There would be no general objection to a CIC's seeking to become a charity. It may be, therefore, that some CICs would seek to become charities by converting to charitable incorporated organisation, or CIO, form. This amendment allows the Home Secretary to make regulations providing for CICs to convert directly to CIO form. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. I ought to put on record a few thanks. Prior to today's deliberations, we had debated the Bill for no fewer than 57 hours, so my guess is that we have topped 60 since it was first introduced in another place in December 2004.
	I thank in particular the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, for one of the most thorough and constructive considerations of a piece of legislation I have ever had any connection with in your Lordships' House. Although he is not here, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, for his persistent and telling approaches. I did not always agree with them, but he nonetheless did good service and stayed the course.
	The noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover, played an important part. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, made in interesting series of interventions. I can even remember the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, keeping us entertained for some hours in the early stages of Committee. At that stage, I almost gave up the will to live. I did not mean that, but I am sure noble Lords understand what I mean. Back-Benchers have played a commendably important role in the Bill, and I express my gratitude to them.
	I also thank the charities that have become involved in the process. Their advice to Members from all parts of the House has been helpful. There have been some amendments that would not otherwise have found their way onto the statute book without them. There are also one or two individuals who petitioned us for particular things, showed some powerful insights into the operation of the law and enabled us to make some constructive changes. Bodies that represent charities and their interests, particularly the Charity Law Association, are owed a debt of gratitude. I am most grateful to them for their rigorous critical thinking and sensitive, informed approach to the Bill.
	Finally, I thank my colleagues in the Whips Office for putting up with my grumpy nature and occasional ill humour as I have had to go through the Bill in great detail over such a long time. Of course, we all ought to thank the officials who have serviced these debates. The Bill team has been magnificent, and the collaborative work between it and the Charity Commission has enabled us to solve some problems that otherwise might not have reached a friendly and intelligent resolution. So, to all those parties, I say a big thanks. It has been a pleasure, and I hope that the Bill now finds favour in another place.
	Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: My Lords, I add my sincere thanks to the Minister for all that he has done and for his patience. It seems to have been a long time since we started. The Second Reading of the Bill in its original form was on Thursday 20 January, so I am not surprised that there have been 60 hours of debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, who kept me on the straight and narrow from a legal point of view. I also thank the Bill team and the Charity Commission. I felt that we would never get to a position where there were fewer than 100 amendments on the Marshalled List. We got down to 59 today, which was a big advance.
	Those of us who want to keep legislation short should remember that we have managed to expand the Bill from 72 to 78 clauses and from 129 to 172 pages. That is the result of our efforts, so we have not been as good at holding down the size of the legislation, but I am sure that, thanks to the work of the Minister, the Bill team, Members of the House and outside advisers, the Bill is a very much better piece of legislation. As we wave the Bill goodbye, I express the hope that, in the nicest possible way, we never have to see it again.
	On Question, Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

House adjourned at twenty-two minutes past nine o'clock.
	Tuesday, 8 November 2005.